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Punitive Damages Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)'
was enacted "to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment. ' 2 The devel-
opment of punitive awards under the ADEA has been closely related to
the development of the award of compensatory damages for pain and
suffering resulting from age discrimination. While some of the basic
structural arguments supporting these two awards are similar, punitive
awards are unique in the role they play and the problems they raise in
the age discrimination context.
This Comment examines the role of punitive damages under the
ADEA. The Comment begins by reviewing the nature of the age dis-
crimination problem that the ADEA was designed to address. Next,
the judicial development of punitive damage awards under the ADEA
is discussed. The Comment then examines the propriety of awarding
punitive damages in light of the ADEA's statutory language, its simi-
larity to other statutes, the availability of liquidated damages under the
ADEA, and public policy. The Comment concludes that punitive
damages are necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the
ADEA.
The Age Discrimination Problem
Age discrimination is not usually the result of personal bias, which
often is the cause of discrimination in other areas.3 Rather, age dis-
crimination occurs because of assumptions made by employers regard-
ing the relationship between age and competence.4 Determining that
age discrimination is unjustified and therefore unlawful can be more
difficult than determining the lack of justification for other types of dis-
crimination.5 For example, while it is now accepted that race bears no
legitimate relationship to ability, many persons assume that changes
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Id. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT 2 (June 1965) (Report of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress under § 715
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR].
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2.
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occurring with age are valid bases on which to differentiate treatment
of age groups, 6 and, in some circumstances, age can be a valid occupa-
tional qualification. 7 Furthermore, the most frequently used statistical
comparison, the rate of unemployment as grouped by age categories,
tends to counter the existence of a serious age discrimination problem:
within the age group protected by the ADEA, forty to seventy years,
the unemployment rate is consistently below the average for the entire
labor force.8 This comparison, however, fails to reflect the fact that the
effects of unemployment are likely to be more devastating on an older
employee than on a younger employee. Workers aged forty-five and
older suffer the longest average duration of unemployment. 9 As an
older worker is likely to be unemployed for a longer period than a
younger employee, he or she is also more likely to exhaust available
unemployment insurance benefits, thereby suffering economic hard-
ships.'0 The problems of the older unemployed worker are worsened
by the fact that many persons over forty-five may still have significant
financial obligations. I I Moreover, lengthy unemployment periods may
so discourage the employee that he or she stops looking for a job or
accepts an early involuntary retirement on an inadequate pension
income. 12
The number of employees leaving the labor force at age sixty-five
and younger has increased because of institutional factors, such as So-
cial Security and mandatory retirement. 13 These factors, combined
with policies to promote employees from within a company, seniority
6. O'Donnell, Lasser, & Bailor, The Federal Age Discrimination Statute.- Basic Law,
Areas of Controversy, and Suggestionsfor Compliance, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
7. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
8. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS 178-80 (1978).
9. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARN-
INGS 170 (Jan. 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 18-19.
10. In 1979, of unemployed workers aged 45 and above, approximately 19% were still
unemployed after the traditional unemployment insurance maximum span of 26 weeks. Of
workers aged 16-24, only approximately 5% were unemployed after 26 weeks. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 170 (Jan. 1980).
11. U.S. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. OF-
FICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EMPLOY-
MENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 90 (1978).
12. See, e.g., id.; AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT PROJECT, AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PERSONS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLA-
TION AND ENFORCEMENT 20 (1977); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, E.
MEIER, EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER WORKERS: DISINCENTIVES AND INCENTIVES 3 (April
1980).
13. See AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT PROJECT, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PERSONS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION AND
ENFORCEMENT 23-24 (1977); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, AN IN-
TERIM REPORT 47-48 (May 1980); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, E.
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policies, and the high costs of insurance and pension plans, which are
intended to protect the older worker, have tended to lower the age at
which an employer will consider an employee too old to be hired.
14
Thus, it is more difficult for those between the ages of forty and seventy
to compete successfully for employment.
In addition to economic hardship, workers who experience age
discrimination may suffer adverse psychological reactions.15 Even after
an older worker finds a new job, he or she may continue to suffer from
the earlier displacement because of deteriorating health, loss of self es-
teem, and a sense of alienation.
16
The cost to society is great, both in human resources and in sup-
port through social insurance, welfare, and private insurance.17 More-
over, as those persons born during the post World War II baby boom
approach retirement age and the percentage of older workers in the
work force increases, these problems will become more serious.' 8
The ADEA
Against this background of serious age discrimination, the ADEA
was enacted.' 9 As amended in 1978,20 the ADEA protects persons forty
MEIER, EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER WORKERS: DISINCENTIVES AND INCENTIVES 23 (April
1980).
14. See AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT PROJECT, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PERSONS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION AND
ENFORCEMENT 23-24 (1977); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 15-17; U.S. PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, E. MEIER, EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER WORKERS:
DISINCENTIVES AND INCENTIVES 3 (April 1980).
15. The district court in Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.
N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978), observed
the harsh psychological impact of age discrimination: "It is difficult enough for anyone to
encounter and to surmount the psychological and physiological problems of the aging pro-
cess. Simultaneously to find oneself arbitrarily discharged because the clock has struck a
certain hour adds substantially. . . to these already formidable stresses. The cumulative
effect of an arbitrary and illegal termination of a useful and productive older employee is a
cruel blow to the dignity and self-respect of one who has devoted his life to" productive work,
and can take a dramatic toll." 404 F. Supp. at 329.
16. Parnes & King, Middle-.4ged Job-Losers, INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 77-95
(Spring 1977).
17. See note 190 infra.
18. The number of persons in the United States in the over-40 age group was
77,050,000 in 1975, and is expected to reach 110,166,000 by the year 2000. The number in
the 25-40 group was 42,529,000 in 1975, and is expected to reach 54,922,000 by the year
2000. In terms of the percentage of the population over 25 years of age, this represents an
increase from 64 to 67% in the over-40 age group and a decrease from 36 to 33% in the 25-40
age group. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COM-
MERCE, PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975 to 2050 at 67, 93
(Oct. 1975). See H. SHEPPARD & S. RIx, THE GRAYING OF WORKING AMERICA 1-2 (1977).
19. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
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to seventy years of age from age discrimination, 21 making it unlawful
to discriminate on the basis of age in hiring decisions, discharges, treat-
ment during employment, advertising, referrals by employment agen-
cies, and practices by unions.2 2 Recognizing that "enforcement
procedures are necessary to get the required attention of employers and
others," 23 Congress allowed both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 24 and private parties to institute actions to enforce the
ADEA.25
The enforcement provision of the ADEA is implemented through
the procedural mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).2 6 Under the FLSA, an employee may be entitled to receive an
award consisting of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compen-
sation, and an equal amount of liquidated damages.2 7 The ADEA
specifies that amounts owing for a violation of the ADEA will be
treated as minimum wages and overtime compensation under the
FLSA framework.28
In addition, the ADEA specifically provides for reinstatement,
promotion, compulsory hiring of the rejected applicant, and damages
for back pay.29 Section 7(c) of the ADEA also provides that "[a]ny
person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the pur-
20. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)).
21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
22. Id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
23. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2213, 2215.
24. Effective July 1, 1979, all functions related to age discrimination and enforcement
vested in the Secretary of Labor were transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission by Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app., at 354 (Supp. III 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
26. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The ADEA provides that: "the provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accord-
ance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for
subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of the FLSA, and subsection (c) of this section." Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
27. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
29. The ADEA provides that: "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling em-
ployment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section." Id.
[Vol. 33
poses of [the ADEA]."
30
The FLSA provision for awarding liquidated damages is also in-
corporated into the ADEA.3' The ADEA, however, modifies this
FLSA remedy by conditioning it on the violation being willful.32 The
liquidated damages award is equal to the amount of damages awarded
for a violation.3 3 Thus, the plaintiff in an ADEA action may recover
twice his or her actual damages if the violation is deemed to be
willful.
34
There is no provision in the ADEA for compensatory damages for
pain and suffering. Such damages generally are intended to reimburse
the nonpecuniary harm of physical or emotional injury caused by the
discriminatory act.35 The availability of these damages in ADEA cases
has been a source of considerable unresolved controversy.
36
Punitive damages also are not specifically provided for in the
ADEA. Punitive damages generally are awarded only in cases in
which the defendant exhibits actual malice, evil motive, or conscious
disregard for the consequences of his or her acts.37 Generally, punitive
damages serve any of three functions: retribution, deterrence, and en-
couragement to bring suit.38 Punitive damages are distinguishable
from other types of civil remedies because they normally focus on the
act of the wrongdoer rather than on the harm to the victim. 39 Whether
30. Id. § 626(c).
31. See notes 26-27 & accompanying text supra.
32. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
33. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
34. This formulation differs from the usual formulation of liquidated damages, which
is that amount agreed to by the parties to a contract to be paid for a breach of contract. J.
CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 232-36 (1970); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
35. DOBBS, supra note 34, at 135-36.
36. For a discussion of the availability of compensatory damages for pain and suffer-
ing, see Waters & Pursell, Emotional Distress: The Battle Over a New Tort Under Age Dis-
crimination Continues, 30 LAB. L.J. 667 (1979); Comment, Age Discrimination: Monetary
Damages under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 58 NEB. L. REv. 214,
234-43 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. See note 66 infra.
37. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMICK]; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
38. A fourth function, compensation for elements of damage not otherwise compensa-
ble, has occasionally been asserted. DOBBS, supra note 34, at 205; Note, Damage Remedies
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47, 68-69 (1976);
see Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: Functional Analsis, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 191, 203-18 (1972).
39. DOBBS, supra note 34, at 204; MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 275; PROSSER, supra
note 37, at 9.
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punitive damages may be awarded under the ADEA in any circum-
stances remains unclear.
The History of Punitive Awards Under the ADEA
Until 1975, the ADEA was strictly construed by the courts to pre-
clude an award of either compensatory damages for pain and suffering
or punitive damages. 40 This narrow construction was favored by some
commentators, who believed "that the principal relief contemplated by
the Act is job restitution, rather than monetary damages .. ".. ,41 In
1975, however, a district court awarded compensatory damages for
pain and suffering under the ADEA in Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Engineering Co. 42
The plaintiff in Rogers was a research chemist for Exxon who had
been compelled to retire at the age of sixty43 and who, as a conse-
quence, experienced anxiety and a nervous disturbance. 44 In addition
to experiencing emotional trauma from the forced retirement, Dr. Rog-
ers suffered physical symptoms. 45 The jury found that Exxon had un-
lawfully terminated Dr. Rogers' employment because of his age.
Stating that "[s]uch conduct by an employer toward an older worker
has predictable consequences in terms of the victim's physical and
emotional well-being," 46 the district court entered judgment for $30,000
out-of-pocket losses and a $750,000 jury award for pain and suffering,
47
which was later reduced by the court to $200,000.48
Although the court acknowledged the lack of precedent for its
compensatory award for pain and suffering,49 it concluded that the
broad language of the Act, which permits the court to grant "such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
[the ADEA],' 50 encompasses an award for pain and suffering.5' In de-
termining that the award was appropriate, 52 the court compared the
40. See, e.g., Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
41. Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19
N.Y.L.F. 309, 319 (1973); see also Note, Age Discrimination in Employment under Federal
Law, 9 GA. S.B.J. 114, 127 (1972).
42. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
43. 404 F. Supp. at 326, 329.
44. Id. at 330 & n.2.
45. Id. These physical symptoms included severe abdominal cramping, vomiting, and
impotency.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id. at 337-38.
49. Id. at 331.
50. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
51. Id. at 333.
52. 404 F. Supp. at 328.
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ADEA's purpose to the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964:53 "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of age
discrimination. ' '54 The court determined that, because the ADEA cre-
ated a new statutory tort, the court was thereby authorized to award the
full range of legal and equitable relief available in intentional tort
actions. 55
Following the Rogers decision, other federal district courts granted
compensatory damages for pain and suffering.5 6 In Murphy v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp. 57 the district court expanded the holding in Rogers
and awarded punitive damages under the ADEA. 58 The Murphy court
rejected the employer's argument that, because the ADEA is analogous
to Title VII, under which punitive damages are not recoverable, puni-
tive damages should not be available under the ADEA. 59 In distin-
guishing the ADEA from Title VII, the court noted that, while Title
VII authorizes equitable relief, the ADEA allows both equitable and
legal relief. Punitive damages are traditionally legal relief. Thus, the
court reasoned that their unavailability under Title VII should not de-
termine their availability under the ADEA.60 The court concluded
that, under the Rogers court's statutory tort analysis, punitive damages
are properly recoverable under the ADEA.
6'
Following Rogers and Murphy, several other district courts
awarded punitive damages under the ADEA.62 In 1977, however, the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's opinion in Rogers,63 and held
that the statute's failure to mention the availability of compensatory
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
55. Id. at 333.
56. Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Il. 1976), af'd on
rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 397 (N.D. Ga.
1976); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 15
F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 411 (N.D. Ga. 1976), vacated, 15 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 413 (1977).
57. 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978). For a
discussion of the background of Murphy and of the American Motors policy of eliminating
older sales personnel to increase sales, see The Turnaround Tactics at American Motors,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 5, 1972, at 58-61.




62. Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 397 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.E.P. Cases
(BNA) 411 (N.D. Ga. 1976), vacated, 15 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 413 (1977); Wilson v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 15 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1158 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
63. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
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relief indicated that Congress did not contemplate this remedy.64 In
addition, the court reasoned that such an award might impair the con-
ciliation process, which is a key element in the ADEA statutory
scheme, by making it less likely that employees and employers would
settle their disputes out of court.65 Therefore, the Third Circuit held
that compensatory damages for pain and suffering are not available
under the ADEA.
66
With the reversal of Rogers, courts began to reconsider the availa-
bility of punitive relief under the ADEA. The Fifth Circuit in Dean v.
American Security Insurance Co. 67 held that neither punitive damages
nor compensatory damages for pain and suffering are available under
64. 550 F.2d at 841. The court also reasoned that Congress did not intend an award of
pain and suffering damages because the uncertainty introduced into the administrative pro-
cess by such an award might make that process too unwieldy.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 841-82; see also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1980); Rod-
riguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1241 (3d Cir. 1977).
The Third Circuit's opinion in Rogers has been followed in the four other circuits that
have considered the issue of the availability of compensatory damages for pain and suffering
under the ADEA. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford
Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128 (4th
Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American
Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
In other circuits, however, the federal district courts have split on this issue. The fol-
lowing cases have held that compensatory damages for pain and suffering are available
under the ADEA: e.g., Kalli v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1981); Wise
v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic
Medical Group, 476 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463
F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976),
aft'don rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Gifford v. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462
(N.D. Ohio 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Morton
v. Sheboygan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Karijolic v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 447 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The following cases have held that
compensatory damages for pain and suffering are not available under the ADEA: e.g.,
Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Harris v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 489 F.
Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Brin v. Bigsby & Kruthers, 19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 415 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1979); Knerr v.
Norge Co., 476 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Ill. 1979); Newkirk v. General Electric Co., 20 F.E.P.
Cases (BNA) 1588 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Dunwoodie v. Chrysler Corp., 459 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Riddle v.
Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Schlicke v. Allen-
Bradley Co., 448 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Ellis v. Philippine Air Lines, 443 F. Supp.
251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Hannon v.
Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union
Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
67. 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
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the ADEA.68 The Dean court concluded that the statutory liquidated
damages award available under the ADEA precludes any other award
of a punitive nature.69 The court also compared the specific provision
for punitive damages under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196870
with the ADEA's silence on such damages and concluded that, had
punitive damages been intended under the ADEA, they would have
been specifically provided for, as they were in Title VIII.7 1 Shortly
after Dean, the Fifth Circuit reversed Murphy72 on the same grounds.
73
As a result of these cases, there is little judicial support for the
recovery of punitive damages under the ADEA.74 Nonetheless, some
68. 559 F.2d at 1040. In so concluding, the court cited with approval the holding and
rationale of the Third Circuit's decision in Rogers.
69. Id. at 1039.
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
71. 559 F.2d at 1039.
72. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
73. 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978). The holdings of the Fifth Circuit in Dean and Mur-
phy have consistently been followed by courts in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Lyons v. Allen-
dale Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has
held punitive damages to be unavailable under the ADEA. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605
F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'g 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977). In so ruling, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the lower court's determination, which had been based on the reasoning of
the district court in Dean. Because of dicta in the Third Circuit's opinion in Rogers, and
holdings that pain and suffering damages are not available under the ADEA in the Ninth
Circuit, Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981), and the First Circuit, Vazquez
v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978), it is likely that punitive damages under the
ADEA would be disallowed in these jurisdictions as well.
74. Since the Third Circuit decided Rogers in 1977, only four courts have held that
punitive damages are available under the ADEA. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F.
Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008
(D. Colo. 1980); Karijolic v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 447 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 605 F.2d 128 (4th
Cir. 1979).
There have been few judicial decisions concerning the availability of punitive damages
under the ADEA. The smaller number of cases concerning punitive damages as compared
with compensatory damages may be explained by three factors.
First, in age discrimination suits, the circumstances that give rise to a claim for punitive
damages occur less frequently than those that give rise to compensatory damages for physi-
cal or emotional harm. As circumstances of aggravation or outrage are required for punitive
damages but not for compensatory damages for pain and suffering, the cases in which a
punitive award is warranted are more limited. E.g., Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 37 & accompa-
nying text supra.
Second, the availability of liquidated damages has blocked many courts considering an
award of punitive relief. These courts reason that, because liquidated damages under the
ADEA serve a punitive function, no other punitive relief is available. See, e.g., Walker v.
Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F. 2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Pavlo v. Stiefel Labo-
ratories, 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gifford v. Diagnostics, 458 F.
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courts do offer such relief. In Kariaolic v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. ,75
the district court declined to follow the Third Circuit's holding in Rog-
ers and denied a motion to dismiss claims for punitive damages and
mental distress. 76 In Kennedy v. Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. ,77 the court upheld punitive damages under the ADEA, not-
ing that punitive damages are a legal remedy and reasoning that
punitive damages are available because the ADEA specifically autho-
rizes legal relief.78 The court rejected a comparison with Title VII on
the ground that only equitable relief is authorized under that statute.
79
The most recent case upholding punitive damages is Wise v. Olan
Mills Inc. .80 In Wise, the court cited the strong policy favoring such an
award 8' and stated that the remedies specifically authorized by the Act,
including liquidated damages, would not in all cases fulfill the clear
purposes of the ADEA.8 2 The court found that the statutory language
allowing legal or equitable relief to effectuate the purposes of the
ADEA would authorize an award of punitive damages in an appropri-
ate case.8 3 The court also rejected the argument that the award of puni-
tive damages impeded conciliation between parties.
84
Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218
(D. Colo. 1977).
Third, the courts have generally been more restrictive in awarding punitive damages in
all types of cases than they have been in awarding claims for compensatory relief. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 135 (3d Cir. 1981); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429
F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. 19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 447 (N.D. 111. 1977).
76. Id. at 447-48. The court relied on the plain language of the Act and on an earlier
decision in that district that had upheld compensatory damages for pain and suffering. Id.
77. 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1978).
78. Id. at 1010-11.
79. Id. at 1010. In support of its reasoning, the Kennedy court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), which upheld the right to jury
trial under the ADEA. Id. at 585. The Lorillard court focused on the significance of a
"legal" remedy under the ADEA as indicating the right to a jury trial under that statute. Id.
at 583-84. The Kennedy court noted the absence of this term in distinguishing Title VII. 449
F. Supp. at 1010.
80. 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980).
81. "[T]he willful and arbitrary assignment of older citizens to society's trash heap may
be so grossly unfair and unreasonable, in some cases, as to justify imposing exemplary
damages."
82. Id. at 543 (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621(b) (1976)).
83. 485 F. Supp. at 543.
84. The court reasoned that this argument reflected only the employer's viewpoint and
ignored the impetus to conciliation that punitive damages have on recalcitrant employers.
Id. at 544-45. Moreover, the court noted that conciliation was neither the only purpose nor
the overriding purpose of the ADEA. Id. at 544. Judge Carrigan found unpersuasive the
statement in the House Conference Committee Report on the 1978 amendments to the
ADEA that "the ADEA as amended by this Act does not provide remedies of a punitive
nature." H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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The foregoing review of the case law that has developed in the
area of punitive damages under the ADEA highlights many of the is-
sues that are discussed further below. Although the trend in the cases
concerning punitive damages has paralleled the development in the
case law concerning the availability of compensatory damages for pain
and suffering under the ADEA, the unique problems involved in the
award of punitive damages warrant separate consideration.
85
Statutory Construction
Most arguments concerning the punitive award under the ADEA
have centered on the interpretation of the statute's language.86 Al-
though courts allowing punitive damages or pain and suffering dam-
ages generally have found the language broad and unambiguous,
8 7
courts denying these remedies have found the statutory language quali-
fying and limiting.88
The courts that have denied the award of punitive damages gener-
ally have relied on one of three reasons. First, because the ADEA does
not specifically refer to punitive relief, the court may not infer such
relief from the statute.89 Second, the listing of remedies under section
7(b) is limiting rather than illustrative, and therefore only those reme-
dies listed by the statute are available.90 Third, because the enforce-
AD. NEws 528, 535. While this statement appears on its face to present the death knell for
the recovery of punitive damages under the Act, the court noted that the conference report
was focusing on the Act's jury trial provisions and not its remedies provisions. Citing the
Act's unambiguous language and statement of purpose, the court decided that the confer-
ence report statement was not determinative of the issue of punitive damages. 485 F. Supp.
at 544.
85. While no court that has disallowed compensatory damages for pain and suffering
has allowed punitive damages under the ADEA, at least three courts that have allowed
compensatory damages have, nonetheless, refused to allow punitive damages for age dis-
crimination. Kalli v. Great American Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1981); Pavlo v.
Stiefel Laboratories, 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gifford v. Diagnostics,
458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
86. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
87. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Colo. 1980); Flynn v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
88. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1979); Slatin v. Stanford
Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295 (4th Cir. 1979); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co.,
550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
89. Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
90. Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich.
1977). The court applied the principle of eiusdem generis to limit relief. Under the ejusdem
generis principle of statutory construction, "where general words follow the enumeration of
particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated. . . ." Campbell v. Board of Dental Examin-
ers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 283, 285 n.2, 125 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 n.2 (1975).
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ment scheme of the FLSA is incorporated by reference into the ADEA,
only those damages available under the FLSA are available under the
ADEA.91 Thus, the damages available under the FLSA, unpaid mini-
mum wages, unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages, 92 are the only
ones appropriate under the ADEA.
The broad remedial provisions of the ADEA, however, do not
limit punitive damages as much as some courts have suggested. Al-
though the ADEA does not specifically refer to punitive relief, such
relief may be inferred from the statute. Section 7(b) provides that "the
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter," 93 thus
suggesting that appropriate relief in addition to that specifically pro-
vided by the statute could be awarded.
Support for this interpretation is also found in section 7(b), which
provides that relief under the ADEA includes "without limitation judg-
ments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforc-
ing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation under this section."94 As the statute
states that relief is available "without limitation," these two provisions
suggest that the statute makes all legal and equitable relief available
and lists specific forms of relief only as examples.95 Thus, the listing of
remedies under section 7(b) appears to be illustrative rather than
limiting.
The third basis on which courts have denied relief under the
ADEA derives from language of the Act providing that amounts owing
to a person as a result of a violation are deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or overtime compensation for purposes of the FLSA.96 As one
commentator has noted, however, interpreting this phrase as a limita-
tion would have the anomalous result that "nothing ever would need to
be 'deemed to be wages' for the purposes of sections [16 and 17 of the
FLSA] except items that were wages in the first place. ' 97 If, on the
other hand, it is assumed that relief other than wages may be recovered,
91. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
92. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
93. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. The principle of ejusdem generis relied on to limit relief under this section, see note
90 supra, should be used solely when the wording leaves some uncertainty about the purpose
of the legislation and should not be applied when the context manifests a contrary intention.
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed.
1979).
96. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
97. O'Donnell, Lasser, & Bailor, The Federal Age Discrimination Statute: Basic Law,
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such as punitive damages, the phrase "deemed to be" is no longer su-
perfluous, but adds this relief to that which is already available under
the FLSA provisions. 98 This interpretation of the statute, allowing the
inclusion of other forms of relief, would be a preferred interpretation
under general principles of statutory construction. 99
A logical interpretation of the statute dictates, therefore, that the
only express limitation on the relief available under the ADEA is that
the relief be "appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA]."' 00
Under this interpretation, any legal or equitable remedy, including pu-
nitive damages, should be available if the court determines that it pro-
motes the purposes for which the ADEA was enacted.
Determining what is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the
ADEA, however, may be difficult. Arguably, damages appropriate
under the ADEA are limited to those appropriate under the FLSA.10
The First Circuit, in Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 0 2 however, con-
cluded that the language of the ADEA does not limit a plaintiff to the
remedies traditionally available under the FLSA.103 The court held
that the purposes of the ADEA were effectuated by the scheme of dam-
ages available under the FLSA, but stated in dicta: "[We do not sug-
gest permanently foreclosing remedies that might prove essential to
guarantee the integrity of the statute. It may be at some future date it
will be shown that without a damage remedy the purposes of the Act
cannot be realized."' 4 The court thereby implied that it did not find
any absolute statutory impediment to the award of damages other than
those explicitly provided for in the statute. 0 5
Areas of Controversy, and Suggestions for Compliance, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 31
(1979) (footnotes omitted).
98. See id.
99. It is a general rule of statutory construction that no part of a statute should be
construed as surplusage if there is an alternative construction that gives effect to all the
words of the statute. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06
(C. Sands 4th ed. 1972); H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 83
(1896).
100. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
101. See note 91 supra.
102. 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978).
103. Id. at 112. Although the court held that the remedy of compensatory damages is
unavailable under the ADEA, it stated: "While the enforcement provision of the FLSA is
adopted by the ADEA, there is the expansive statutory language. . . in the ADEA which is
absent from the FLSA. This suggests to us the propriety of looking to the reasonableness of
the expectation that the FLSA remedy will effectuate the purposes of the age discrimination
act." Id. at 110-11.
104. Id. at 112 (footnote omitted).
105. Only the First Circuit's interpretation of what relief was necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the Act kept it from reaching the conclusion that such damages were available
under the ADEA. The First Circuit's interpretation in Vazquez more closely parallels the
position taken by courts that have awarded punitive and compensatory pain and suffering
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Thus, the language of the statute does not seem to limit the type of
relief that is available under the ADEA.10 6 Because of its broad grant
of appropriate legal or equitable relief to effectuate the purposes of the
ADEA, the statute supports the position of the district court in Rogers.
The district court held that the ADEA creates a new statutory tort and
that the panoply of traditional tort remedies is available to compensate
for all provable damages.10 7 The statutory tort analysis, however, is
not essential to the award of punitive damages under the ADEA. Even
a more restrictive construction of the statute, as described by the First
Circuit in Vazquez, would lead to the conclusion that, given the proper
circumstances, the court is not limited to FLSA remedies.
relief under the ADEA than that taken by those that have denied it. Compare Wise v. Olan
Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding pain and suffering damages
and punitive damages available) and Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding pain and suffering damages available) with Rogers v. Exxon Re-
search & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (holding
pain and suffering damages not available) and Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (same).
Another approach to statutory construction was taken by the District Court for the
Eastern District of California in Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, 476 F. Supp.
1063 (E.D. Cal. 1979). In upholding the availability of compensatory damages under the
ADEA, the court concluded that the language in § 7(b), which some courts had construed to
lirat relief to that available under the FLSA, was applicable only to actions brought by the
Secretary of Labor. The court reasoned that, unless this interpretation were adopted, there
would be no purpose in providing for relief under § 7(c)(1) as well. Id. at 1064-65. The
court went on to note that section 7(c)(1), which grants private parties the right to bring a
civil action, has none of the language that had been construed by other courts as limiting
relief. Therefore, the court reasoned that, even if the language of § 7(b) did not allow com-
pensatory damages in suits brought by the Secretary, there was no similar limitation placed
upon civil actions brought by a private litigant. Id. at 1065. The court concluded that com-
pensatory damages for pain and suffering effectuated the purposes of the ADEA by provid-
ing incentive for enforcement of the ADEA through private actions, and by encouraging
employers to settle in such actions. Id.
The interpretation adopted by the Hassan court seems to be consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), in
which the court stated: "Under the FLSA provisions incorporated in § 7(b) of the ADEA,
29 U.S.C. § 626(b), the Secretary of Labor may bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved individ-
ual for injunctive and monetary relief. . . . The incorporated FLSA provisions together
with § 7(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), in addition, authorize private civil actions for
'such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of' the ADEA." Id. at 575, 579
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
106. This conclusion is reached despite the position of most circuit courts that have con-
sidered this issue. See Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Pettit
Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1979); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292
(4th Cir. 1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
107. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 327 (1975). See notes 42-




The legislative history of the ADEA is silent on the availability of
punitive damages for a violation of the Act. The sole exception to this
silence is found in the House Conference Report on the 1978 amend-
ments to the ADEA. 08 These amendments contained no provisions to
clarify the controversy concerning the availability of either compensa-
tory or punitive damages. 10 9 In discussing the portion of the amend-
ments concerning jury trials, however, the report states that "[t]he
ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive
nature."110 Although seemingly unambiguous,"' this statement pre-
sents several problems." 12
The implications of this statement are inconsistent and ambiguous.
Rather than stating that punitive damages are unavailable, the report
states that "remedies of a punitive nature" are not available. Courts,
however, have consistently held that the liquidated damages provision
of the ADEA is punitive in nature. "3 The language of the statute sug-
gests that this interpretation of the provision is correct because the pro-
vision allows liquidated damages only for willful violations and thus,
like a punitive award, focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than
on the plaintiff's harm.114
108. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 528, 535.
109. The 1978 amendments to the ADEA extended the protected age group from 65 to
70, provided a right to a jury trial in ADEA actions, modified the procedural requirements
of filing charges and notice, and extended the protection of the act to federal employees.
The amendments did not affect the remedies available under the ADEA. Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)).
110. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 528, 535.
111. Several courts have relied on this passage in holding that punitive damages are
unavailable under the ADEA. E.g., Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298,
304 (D. Conn. 1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945, 948-49 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 680 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
112. One court already has held this sentence to be unpersuasive on the availability of
punitive relief under the ADEA. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D.
Colo. 1980). See note 84 supra.
113. See, e.g., Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215,218 (D. Colo. 1977); Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See
general Richards, Monetary Awardsor Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L.
REv. 305, 332 (1976); Comment, supra note 36, at 239.
114. See note 39 & accompanying text supra. An earlier version of the ADEA bill had
included a criminal penalty provision, similar to that found in the FLSA. Its removal by
Senator Javits' amendment in favor of civil remedies does not indicate that liquidated dam-
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In addition, the statement of a subsequent Congress in determin-
ing what was intended by the Congress that enacted prior legislation is
not persuasive." 15 The Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Ev-
ans 16 considered the import of a statement in the Senate Report ac-
companying the 1978 amendments to the ADEA that resort to state
remedies was optional under the Act." 17 As the statement concerning
punitive damages in the House Conference Report was not a subject of
the 1978 amendments, deferral to state agencies also was not a subject
of the 1978 amendments." I8 The Court held that the ADEA could not
be given a new interpretation based on the observations of Congress
eleven years after it had been enacted. The Court concluded that,
whatever weight was to be accorded the statement, it was not part of
the legislative history and was therefore insufficient to overcome the
intent of Congress evidenced by the statute itself.' 19
The statement of the Conference Report should not be construed
to preclude punitive damages under the ADEA. The inconsistency of
the statement with the statute when coupled with the statement's lack
of probative value in ascertaining the intent of Congress in enacting the
original legislation clearly indicates that the statement is, at best, ques-
tionable authority.
Analogy to Other Acts
\Because of the lack of legislative history on the issue of punitive
damages under the ADEA, courts have analogized to the provisions of
other related statutes for insight on how the remedial provisions of the
ADEA were intended to operate. Courts most often have referred to
ages serve no punitive function, but rather that they act as a more effective deterrent. As
Senator Javits stated before the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Wel-
fare Committee: "[T]he criminal penalty in cases of willful violations has been eliminated
and a double damage liability substituted. This will furnish an effective deterrent to willful
violations and at the same time avoid the difficult problems of proof which would arise
under a criminal provision." 113 CONG. Rac. 7076 (1967).
The Conference Committee relied on Overnight Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S.
572 (1942), an early Supreme Court case holding that liquidated damages were compensa-
tory under the FLSA. Id. at 583-84. It thus is possible that the conferees assumed the
liquidated damages provision under the ADEA was similarly compensatory. This assump-
tion, if made, was clearly inaccurate; liquidated damages under the ADEA are punitive in
nature, and even under the FLSA it is doubtful that liquidated damages serve no punitive
function. Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal PayAct Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REV. 328, 348-
50 (1975).
115. Note, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Age Discrimination in Employment, 32
U. FLA. L. REV. 701, 727-28 (1980).
116. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
117. Id. at 758.
118. See note 109 supra.
119. 441 U.S. at 758.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,120 which concerns other types
of employment discrimination, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968,121 which concerns fair housing, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act,' 22 from which the ADEA's enforcement mechanism was adapted.
The aims and substantive prohibitions of the ADEA and Title VII
are similar.123 Thus, some courts have stated that, because Title VII
does not allow for punitive relief, neither should the ADEA.12 4 Despite
the similarity of their prohibitions, however, the pertinent enforcement
and remedial provisions of the two acts are different. 2 5 First, the
ADEA incorporates a modified version of the FLSA framework rather
than the enforcement provisions of Title VII.' 2 6 Second, the ADEA
permits a plaintiff to obtain "legal or equitable relief,"'127 whereas Title
VII allows only "equitable relief."' 28 As punitive damages have been
characterized as a legal remedy, 2 9 the difference between allowing
both legal and equitable remedies and allowing only equitable reme-
dies is significant.'
30
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
122. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The import of the FLSA is discussed elsewhere in this Comment. See notes 86-107 & ac-
companying text supra & notes 134-77 & accompanying text infra.
123. Title VII, with respect to race, color, sex, or national origin, and the ADEA, with
respect to age, both provide that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual" or otherwise to "discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on these bases. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
124. E.g., Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977); see
also Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D. Colo. 1978);
Murphy v. American Motors Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'dper
cur/am, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978) (this argument was considered and rejected by these
courts).
125. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978); Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
126. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 583-85; Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F.
Supp. at 678-79.
127. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
128. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
129. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
130. In the context of the availability of jury trials under the ADEA, the Supreme Court
in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), focused on the language of these remedial provi-
sions, concluding that, "by providing specifically for legal relief, Congress knew the signifi-
cance of the term legal .... " Id. at 583. The Court concluded that a Title VII analogy was
inapposite because of the "significant differences" in the "remedial and procedural provi-
sions of the two laws." Id. at 584.
In Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698 (1981), the Supreme Court declined to extend
the right to jury trials under the ADEA to actions brought against the government under
§ 15(c) of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976). The court distinguished its analysis of the
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Title VIII, prohibiting discrimination in housing, also has been re-
lied on to resolve the punitive damages issue under the ADEA. Title
VIII expressly allows an award of punitive damages up to $1,000 for
violations of that Act.' 31 In light of the ADEA's silence on the matter,
some courts have reasoned that the express provision for punitive dam-
ages in Title VIII indicates that, had Congress intended to include pu-
nitive damages under the ADEA, it would have done so expressly.
32
The provision in Title VIII can be interpreted, however, as a statutory
limitation on an award available at common law rather than an express
allowance of punitive damages.1 33 As no limitation of punitive dam-
ages exists under the ADEA, the availability of punitive damages with-
out limit can be inferred from the Act.
Liquidated Damages
The largest obstacle to an award of punitive damages under the
ADEA is the availability of liquidated damages under the Act. Most
courts and commentators agree that the availability of liquidated dam-
term "legal" in Lorillard from the situation presented in Lehman in that no right to jury trial
was available in suits against the government at common law. Id. at 2703. Therefore, the
Court reasoned, no right to jury trial could be inferred from the term "legal relief' where
suit was brought against the government. Id.
Similarly, this Title VII analogy has been rejected by courts in the damages context.
Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Pavlo v. Stiefel
Laboratories, 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kennedy v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D. Colo. 1978).
Some courts and commentators have concluded that punitive damages are available
under Title VII, further clouding the validity of a comparison of the ADEA to Title VII as
the basis of an argument that the ADEA does not allow punitive damages. United States v.
Detroit Edison Co., 6 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 612, 643 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Dessenberg v. Ameri-
can Metal Forming Co., 6 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 159, 161 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Tooles v. Kellogg
Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Neb. 1972); Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REv. 603 (1973); Comment, Implying Punitive
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 325 (1974).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
132. E.g., Dean v. American See. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217-18 (D. Colo. 1977).
133. Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603, 618 (1973).
One commentator has referred to a comparison of Title VIII and Title VII on the issue
of punitive damages as "pure speculation." Id. Another writer suggests "that Congress will
act consistently in drafting legislation is a weak premise for any argument. Because the
legislative process is flexible, dynamic, and everchanging, it is unreasonable to assume that
Congress will treat the question of punitive damages similarly in different items of legisla-
tion." Comment, supra note 36, at 244-45. Moreover, it can be argued that Congress was at
least as concerned about age discrimination in employment as it was about discrimination in
housing and therefore would favor punitive damages in this analogous area as well.
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ages under the ADEA is primarily punitive. 134 It has been suggested,
therefore, that no other punitive relief should be available. 135 The pu-
nitive function of liquidated damages, however, should not determine
the availability of punitive damages in addition to liquidated damages
under the ADEA because there is no support under the statute or its
legislative history for the exclusion of punitive damages on this basis.'
36
Furthermore, the awards need not be mutually exclusive because they
address dissimilar conduct and involve different standards of
proof. 137Finally, punitive and liquidated damages have developed from
two separate fields of remedies, further eroding the proposition that
they are mutually exclusive. 1
38
The Nature of Liquidated Damages
Although the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA was
adopted from the FLSA,139 it is not identical to that provision. Under
section 16(b) of the FLSA, any employer in violation of the minimum
wage or overtime requirements is automatically liable for back pay and
for an additional amount of liquidated damages. 140 Therefore, liqui-
dated damages are mandatory for every violation. Section 11 of the
Portal to Portal Act of 1947141 (PPA) alleviated the harshness of this
rule. Under this provision, the court was given the discretion to release
an employer from the burden of liquidated damages if the employer
could show that it had acted in good faith.142
134. See note 113 supra.
135. Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Gifford v. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978); see also Note, Damage
Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47, 71
(1976).
136. See notes 86-133 & accompanying text supra. While opponents of punitive relief
under the ADEA have cited legislative history supporting the proposition that liquidated
damages under the ADEA are punitive, see, e.g., Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d
1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978), there is no support in this
history for the inference that no other punitive relief is available.
137. See notes 167-73 & accompanying text infra.
138. See notes 174-77 & accompanying text infra.
139. See notes 26-27 & accompanying text supra.
140. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
141. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976).
142. Section I 1 of the Portal-to-Portal Act provides that "fi]n any action ... to recover
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award ro
liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in
section 216 of this title."
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Prior to the enactment of the PPA,143 the award of liquidated dam-
ages in the FLSA was not considered punitive in nature. The Supreme
Court stated that this award was "compensation, not a penalty or pun-
ishment by the government. . . ."144 This view of the purpose of liq-
uidated damages under the FLSA still prevails among the courts.
14
One commentator, however, has criticized this view, arguing that under
the PPA provisions the award of liquidated damages has a punitive
character. 146
Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that the Act "shall be enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies and procedures provided in
sections [11(b), 16 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 17 of the
FLSA] .... ,,147 Under the ADEA, however, these provisions are lim-
ited by the proviso that "liquidated damages shall be payable only in
cases of willful violations of the ADEA."148 Although the drafters in-
corporated in the ADEA the liquidated damages provision of section
16(b) of the FLSA, they also limited this award to cases of willful viola-
tion and omitted any express reference to section 11 of the PPA. Thus,
the framework for liquidated damages under the ADEA is not identical
to the FLSA framework.
In interpreting the ADEA liquidated damages provision, the
courts have concluded that the "willful" proviso renders this provision
punitive in nature, unlike the provision contained in the FLSA. 149 The
ADEA provision focuses on the actions of the defendant, and thus ap-
pears to have been intended to have a deterrent effect upon willful vio-
lators. Similarly, because of the difference in the statutory schemes and
the omission of any reference to section 11 of the PPA, almost all courts
have held that section 11 of the PPA and its good faith test are inappli-
cable to the ADEA.1
50
143. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947).
144. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
145. See McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1971).
146. See Richards, Monetary Awards on Equal Pay Act Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REv. 328,
348-50 (1975).
147. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979); Hannon v.
Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217-18 (D. Colo. 1977); Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Richards,
Monetary Awards for Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REv. 305, 327-35
(1976).
150. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (Ist Cir. 1979); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 352 (W.D.
Mo. 1975). Contra Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1309-11 (5th Cir. 1976);
Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976). For an analysis of
the approach taken in these cases, see Richards, Monetary A wardsfor Age Discrimination in
Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305, 328-31 (1976); Comment, supra note 36, at 225-29.
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The Standard of Willfulness
To determine the availability of liquidated damages in an ADEA
action, one must define a "willful violation." The courts in general
have relied on the FLSA for a definition of willfulness, and in particu-
lar have looked to section 6 of the PPA, which extends the limitation
period from two to three years for a willful violation of the FLSA.15'
Willfulness in this context has been defined by the courts as any viola-
tion that is "intentional, knowing or voluntary, as distinguished from
accidental and . . . marked by careless disregard whether or not one
has the right so to act."' 52 Under this standard, the Fifth Circuit has
held a violation of the FLSA to be willful, notwithstanding a finding
that the employer had acted in good faith.1 53 This standard has been
carried over and directly applied to the liquidated damages provision
of the ADEA.154
In Bishop v. Jellef -Associates,55 the district court required both
knowledge of the ADEA and bad faith on the part of the employer in
seeking to avoid the provisions of the Act for a finding of willful behav-
ior.' 56 This test appears the same as the good faith standard in section
11 of the PPA, except that the burden of proof seems to be on the plain-
tiff to show the employer's bad faith, rather than on the employer to
show his or her own good faith, as under section 11 of the PPA.' 57 The
standard used in Bishop is more difficult for a plaintiff to meet and is
similar to the standard of willfulness applied in criminal cases.' 58
The standard of willfulness was recently considered in Wehr v.
151. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). See note 154 infra.
152. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (citing United States
v. Illinois Central R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938)); accord Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, 458
F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Nabob Oil Co. v. United
States, 190 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1951); Bailey v. Pilots' Ass'n for Bay & River Delaware,
406 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hodgson v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 741, 747 (M.D. Fla. 1972), modfed on other grounds sub nom, Brennan v. Vetrans
Cleaning Serv., 482 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973).
153. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972); see also Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974); Brennan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.
1973).
154. Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1981); Spagnalo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 282-
83 (3d Cir. 1980); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1976);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 334-35 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Contra Kelly
v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1981).
155. 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
156. Id. at 593.
157. See note 142 supra.
158. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
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Burroughs Corp. ,159 in which the Third Circuit undertook an extensive
review of the criminal and civil definitions of willfulness. The court
noted that, although in the criminal context an element of evil motive
or bad faith must be proven, the traditional civil definition of willful-
ness is appropriate under the ADEA.' 60 The court held that a discrimi-
natory act ;s willful when it is shown "that the [employer] discharged
the employee because of age and that the discharge was voluntary and
not accidental, mistaken, or inadvertent."'
6
1
Several problems are presented by the Wehr court's definition of
willful. First, almost every violation could be termed willful under this
standard, because it is unlikely that an employer could accidently, mis-
takenly, or inadvertently discharge an employee on the basis of his or
her age.' 62 Second, because the ADEA requires all employers to post
notices of the Act in their place of business, 163 it is possible to presume
an employer's knowledge of the Act, Under the standard enunciated in
Wehr, even an employer who had consulted an attorney and believed
that he or she was acting within a recognized exception to the Act when
discriminating on the basis of age might be held to have committed a
willful, voluntary, and knowing, rather than accidental, violation.' 64
This result can not have been intended under the Act. As there is
no automatic liquidated damages award under the ADEA, it is anoma-
lous to have the restriction placed on liquidated damages interpreted to
provide for liquidated damages in nearly every case. Moreover, it is
unlikely that the strict criminal standard of willfulness as applied in
Bishop was intended, as criminal penalties under the ADEA were re-
jected because a criminal standard would be too difficult to meet.165
The scheme in section 11 of the PPA, which places the burden on the
employer to show good faith to avoid a finding of willfulness, is a
workable compromise between the loose standard borrowed from the
FLSA and the criminal standard of willfulness applied in Bishop. As
most courts have held section 11 of the PPA to be inapplicable to the
159. 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 279-83.
161. Id. at 283.
162. Under the FLSA, however, an inadvertent bookkeeping error conceivably could
result in a violation of minimum wage requirements. Note, Damage Remedies Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47, 76 n. 133 (1976).
163. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
164. See Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1971) (employer's violation of the FLSA was willful even though a lawyer advised
the employer that he was exempt from the Act).
165. "While the criminal provision may have a certain emotional appeal, it is not only
unnecessary but self-defeating, for it may well carry with it the much higher burden of proof
inherent in criminal cases ...." 113 CONG. REc. 2199 (1967) (statement of Senator Javits).
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ADEA, 166 it is uncertain what approach the courts will follow to for-
mulate a workable standard.
Liquidated Damages and Punitive Damages Contrasted
The standard under which liquidated damages are awarded differs
from that under which punitive damages are awarded. Professor Mc-
Cormick set forth the following standard for the award of punitive
damages: "To subject a wrongdoer to liability for exemplary damages,
it must be found that he acted with actual malice, ill will, or conscious
disregard of consequences to others."' 67 Dean Prosser noted that such
awards are made only when "the defendant's wrongdoing has been in-
tentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently
associated with crime .... ,,168 When this standard is compared to the
"voluntary and not accidental, mistaken, or inadvertent"'169 standard
that has been applied under the liquidated damages provision of the
ADEA, it becomes clear that two different types of conduct are re-
quired to trigger these different remedies.
The punitive damages standard, requiring actual malice, is a
higher burden for a plaintiff to meet than any formulation of the will-
fulness standard for liquidated damages. Congress could have in-
tended to allow liquidated damages as a limited supplemental punitive
remedy that would be easier to recover than punitive damages, thus
strengthening the enforcement of the ADEA. Liquidated damages
would deter those violations that are merely willful, and thus not sub-
ject to a traditional punitive damages award. Rather than liquidated
damages being the sole measure of punitive relief available, however,
the additional deterrent factor provided by punitive damages would be
brought to bear against those violations that are malicious and
outrageous.
The scope and amount of an award of liquidated damages also
differs from an award of punitive damages. Regardless of an em-
ployer's conduct, liquidated damages under the ADEA are always
measured by the amount of actual monetary damages owing as a result
of the discriminatory act. 170 Punitive damages, however, are directed
at more outrageous acts and thus are determined in light of the actions
of the employer.171 Thus, punitive damages are not limited to the
amount of actual damages and can be adjusted to provide an appropri-
ate reprimand for the particular act committed by an employer. In this
166. See note 150 & accompanying text supra.
167. MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 280.
168. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 9.
169. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980).
170. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 37-39 & accompanying text supra.
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way, punitive damages can provide the more severe penalties necessary
to deter malicious violations by employers, while in those violations
that are merely willful the more limited penalty of liquidated damages
is appropriate.
Although punitive damages are distinguishable from liquidated
damages, some have feared that allowing both remedies in one ADEA
action would result in a double recovery. 172 This need not be the case;
in those situations in which the employer acts willfully but not mali-
ciously, only liquidated damages would be awarded. On the other
hand, when a punitive award is appropriate, a double recovery may be
avoided by treating the liquidated damages penalty as a set-off against
the total punitive damages award. Thus, when the amount of punitive
damages exceeds the amount of liquidated damages that would be
awarded in the situation, the plaintiff will receive both the liquidated
damages award and the punitive damages award reduced by the
amount of the liquidated damages. The total award will therefore not
exceed that which would normally be given as punitive damages. If the
punitive award should be the same as or less than the liquidated award,
only the liquidated damages would be awarded. 173
Conceptual problems may arise in awarding liquidated damages
under the ADEA. Liquidated damages are traditionally a contractual
remedy, compensatory in nature. When a contractual provision for liq-
uidated damages is determined to act as a penalty, it is held to be void
and unenforceable. 7 4 The remedy of liquidated damages does not
present a conceptual problem under the FLSA because it has been held
that a violation of that Act sounds in contract. 75 However, violations
172. Lyons v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Fellows
v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 202 (D. Or. 1977).
173. The following example illustrates how the two remedies could act in conjunction
with each other: "An employer willfully violates the ADEA by firing an employee because
of his age. The employer's acts are so outrageous that under normal circumstances an award
of $25,000 in punitive damages would be appropriate. The employee was not earning much
money at his job, so his back pay award amounted to only $10,000. Because the violation
was willful, the employee would also be entitled to $10,000 in liquidated damages under the
ADEA. This $10,000 which, in effect, represents a form of punitive damages, is $15,000 less
than the $25,000 that normally would have been awarded as punitive damages . . . . [If
punitive damages were allowable, it would be appropriate to assess the employer an addi-
tional $15,000 in punitive damages. This would not be a double recovery although the em-
ployee would be receiving two amounts which reflect a punitive purpose, since the total
amount would be $25,000, the amount the situation called for initially. . . . [Now] [a]ssume
that the employer's acts only merited a total punitive damages award of $5,000 to $10,000.
The total amount of recovery would be encompassed by the award of liquidated damages
and no other punitive relief would be awarded." Comment, supra note 36, at 246.
174. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1977); DOBBS, supra
note 34, at 821-22; MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 603-08; U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
175. Smoke Mount Indus. v. Fisher, 224 N.C. 72, 29 S.E.2d 128 (1944).
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of antidiscrimination statutes, such as the ADEA, sound in tort.1 76
Furthermore, the liquidated damages provision under the ADEA
appears to function as a penalty. 77 Liquidated damages under the
ADEA thus are a remedy unknown at common law in either contract
or tort. They represent a contract remedy applied to a statutory tort in
such a way as to be unenforceable in a contract action. Consequently,
although the liquidated damages provision was designed to serve as a
penalty under the ADEA, its hybrid nature makes it doubtful that it
can serve the same function traditionally served by punitive damages.
Liquidated damages under the ADEA are best considered as a
unique remedy, neither conceptually nor functionally identical to any
other remedy in contract or tort. As such, they can not be expected to
replace punitive damages completely, but should be interpreted as a
complementary remedy available in addition to traditional common
law remedies under the ADEA. Thus, liquidated damages do not seem
to present the insurmountable barrier to punitive damages that has
been suggested.
Policy Considerations: Conciliation and Effective Enforcement
Even after the major statutory and conceptual impediments to the
award of punitive damages under the ADEA are overcome, however,
the court must still determine, as a matter of policy, whether the rem-
edy of punitive damages is such "relief as may be appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of [the ADEA]."' 178 Two concerns that are likely to
be important in this determination are the effect of the punitive dam-
ages award on the conciliation process, and the ability of the punitive
damages award to decrease the incidence of age discrimination through
deterrence and more effective enforcement of the ADEA.
Section 7(b) of the Act provides that, "[b]efore instituting any ac-
tion under this section, the Secretary shall attempt to. . . effect volun-
tary compliance with the requirements of this [Act] through informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion."' 179 It has been
asserted that the availability of punitive damages would encourage
conciliation.'8 0 Those opposed to punitive damages, however, argue
that conciliation would be stifled if punitive damages were allowed, be-
cause such an award would make an employee less willing to settle his
or her claim with the employer voluntarily. 81
176. Dillon v. AFBIC Development Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979).
177. See notes 113-14 & accompanying text supra.
178. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
179. Id.
180. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D. Colo. 1980).
181. See, e.g., Boddorffv. Publicker Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Harmon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977).
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Rather than hamper conciliation, however, punitive damages
merely shift some of the bargaining power from the employer to the
employee.18 2 This shift seems justified because the ADEA was imple-
mented to protect the employee,18 3 and this shift in bargaining power
may even enhance conciliation. 84 A potential punitive award may
make employers more willing to settle. 8 5 As employers generally will
seek the most cost-effective solution to minimize their losses, the impe-
tus to conciliation may be strengthened rather than impaired by the
availability of punitive relief.
186
Moreover, punitive damages may decrease and deter future viola-
tions by encouraging employees to enforce the ADEA when it other-
wise would not be economically feasible or when the Secretary will not
or cannot act. Traditional remedies are not as effective as punitive
damages in encouraging the litigation of claims, deterring future dis-
crimination, and adequately compensating the plaintiff for mental pain
and suffering from humiliation and indignation.
8 7
Although the maximum economic benefit is derived by society as a
whole through the continued employment of the older worker, such
may not be the case for the individual employer. The older worker
increases the costs of private pension, health, and insurance plans.
88
In addition, the employer may perceive other cost advantages to not
hiring the older worker, some of which may be unfounded and arbi-
trary. 8 9 These increased employer costs, however, must be balanced
against the enormous cost to society of failing to use highly skilled
human resources and the drain of higher taxes to support these older
unemployed workers. 190
182. See Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D. Colo. 1980).
183. Id.
184. "If an employer realizes that the most it stands to lose in a private suit is lost wages,
possibly doubled for a willful violation, we think it. . . might be less likely to compromise
the claim short of a lawsuit." Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 111 (1st Cir.
1978).
185. Cf. Hassan v. Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, 476 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal.
1979) (court awarded compensatory damages for pain and suffering).
186. The court in Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978), cited statis-
tics indicating that conciliation does not resolve the great majority of suits under the ADEA.
Id. at I 11. The court also noted that the large population in the protected age group of the
ADEA, when compared with the limited compliance capability of the administrative
agency, indicated that most victims of age discrimination would be forced to bring a private
action to enforce their rights. Id.
187. See, e.g., 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1341 (1974).
188. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 16.
189. Id. at 2.
190. The Department of Labor estimated that in 1965 these costs included over a million
unused productive working hours each year because of unemployment of workers over 45;
unemployment benefits alone for these workers totaled more than one billion dollars per
year. Id. at 17. Thus, while the enforcement of the ADEA could generate slightly higher
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Punitive damages can act as a more effective deterrent than liqui-
dated damages to employers who engage in age discrimination. In the
absence of punitive damages, an individual employer may determine
that the cost savings of a discriminatory act outweigh the possible legal
penalties. For example, an employer whose hiring decisions are based
solely on a purely economic analysis can include the amount of a possi-
ble liquidated damages award in his or her calculations. Punitive dam-
ages, however, are indeterminate in amount; thus, they may convince
an employer that the added element of risk no longer makes age dis-
crimination worth its perceived cost savings. Punitive damages also
can be scaled to the size of the employer,' 9' and thus are capable of
making an employer "feel" its punishment.
Punitive damages are necessary to prevent and deter outrageous
violations of the ADEA. 192 Some may argue that continual awards of
punitive damages under the ADEA will make the Act too burdensome
to employers, but it should be emphasized that the punitive award will
be made only when the employer acts outrageously or maliciously. In
these circumstances, punitive damages are necessary to provide protec-
tion to the employee.
Conclusion
The history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act evi-
dences a strong concern for the problem of the older worker in the
United States. Although the recent trend towards a narrow construc-
tion of the remedial provisions of the ADEA has led most courts to
reject punitive relief for violations of the Act, there are still valid rea-
sons to support such a remedy. Because of the unique character of age
discrimination and the enforcement mechanisms of the ADEA, other
costs to employers, the overall cost benefit to society in both human and economic terms is
tremendous.
191. DOBBS, supra note 34, at 210; PROssER, supra note 37, at 14.
192. The Secretary of Labor's Report to Congress in 1965 noted that penalties were
necessary and effective: "The existence of a state law with penalties for violations has made
efforts to resolve age discrimination complaints more effective than has been the case where
there have not been such penalties." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 3, at 10. The perni-
cious effects of age discrimination upon the older worker are an even more compelling rea-
son for this extra measure of enforcement in the case of age discrimination. The report,
which precipitated the enactment of the ADEA, noted that "[tlhere is. . .no harsher verdict
in most men's lives than someone else's judgement that they are no longer worth their keep."
Id. at 1. In his address to Congress recommending the passage of an act to prohibit age
discrimination in employment, President Johnson noted that such discrimination "is a seri-
ous-and senseless-economic] loss to a nation on the move. But the greater loss is the
cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and
their families." Special Message to Congress Proposing Programsfor Older Americans, I
PUB. PAPERS 32, 37 (January 23, 1967).
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civil rights statutes are of little aid in determining what relief is
available.
Liquidated damages present a particular problem to the award of
punitive damages because of their own punitive function. Some courts
and commentators have argued that the availability of liquidated dam-
ages, a quasi-punitive remedy, precludes the award of punitive dam-
ages. Despite the punitive nature of liquidated damages, both the
standard to be met and the conduct to be punished can be construed as
separate and distinct from that required for awarding punitive dam-
ages. Thus, these two remedies can operate in a complementary, as
opposed to a mutually exclusive, manner without the plaintiff receiving
a double recovery.
As Cicero said, "[t]he greatest incentive to sin is the hope of not
being punished."' 193 The availability of punitive relief would deter vio-
lations of the ADEA and in this manner would effectuate the purpose
of the Act by discouraging age discrimination. The possibility of a re-
covery of punitive damages under the ADEA would also make cost-
conscious employers think twice before deciding that age discrimina-
tion is their most cost-effective solution.
Finally, because of the scope of the problem of age discrimination
and the limited resources that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has to enforce the law, effective enforcement will only
come about through actions brought by individual employees. To en-
courage wronged employees to bring suit, appropriate relief must be
available so that the legislative goal of eliminating the economic and
social tolls imposed by arbitrary age discrimination may be fulfilled.
George J. Wardwell*
193. CICERO, PRO MILONE ch. 16, § 43.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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